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Abstract: This article summarises Professor Martin Krygier's work on the rule of law
and his view that arbitrariness is its core and is under-theorised. From ancient
philosophy, the author suggests that our rule of law settlement feels tentative
because arbitrariness is a human characteristic that cannot be completely fixed with
institutional checks and balances. The author observes that a variety of rule of law
virtues are already expected of judicial decision-makers and suggests that these
institutional virtues should be transferred into the administrative, executive and
corporate decision-making space to advance the rule of law project.
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There have been many efforts to define the rule of law, perhaps most famously at
the end of the 19th century in the work of Albert Venn Dicey.1 There is discussion
whether he captured a new concept or merely coined a description which has
genealogy reaching back into the work of the most famous Greek philosophers
including Aristotle and Plato.2 My interest in the field has been most stimulated by
the more recent work of Martin Krygier from the University of New South Wales. He
has spent a significant part of his academic life working to identify the principles that
underlie the idea of the rule of law,3 but has chosen not to generalise beyond the
idea that it is founded upon the rejection of any kind of arbitrary rule. 4 His
confirmation that because the rule of law is a sociological instrument that can be

1

For example, Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 1885).
Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin, 2011) 3.
3
For example, Martin Krygier, Fear, Hope, Politics and Law, Papers on Parliament No 33, 1999
https://www.aph.gov.au/~/~/link.aspx?_id=C6A9A0D3166348198EE463CB9E301777&_z=z (Fear and Hope);
Martin Krygier, Magna Carta and the Rule of Law Tradition (2015) https://www.ruleoflaw.org.au/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/Magna-Carta-and-the-Rule-of-Law-Tradition-final.pdf (Magna Carta and the Rule of
Law Tradition); and Martin Krygier, ‘The Rule of Law: Pasts, Presents and Two Possible Futures’ (2016) (12)
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 199 (Two Possible Futures).
4
Krygier, Fear and Hope, above n 3, [14]–[25], [39]–[42]; Krygier, Magna Carta and the Rule of Law Tradition,
above n 3, 12–14; Krygier, Two Possible Futures, above n 3, 202–06.
2

abused by self-willed human leaders,5 means that his conclusions seem tentative
even though they do not rest on shaky ground.
In this article, I do two things. I tribute Martin Krygier as one of the foremost
exponents of the idea that the content of the rule of law can only ever be generalised
to the idea that any kind of arbitrary rule must be rejected.6 While there is debate as
to whether general ‘laundry lists’ of rule of law virtues advance the cause of limiting
arbitrary power because every country is so different,7 I suggest that the rule of law
cause would be advanced if the list of virtues we recognise as justly limiting judicial
power were transferred to limit executive, legislative and corporate power.
I explore the consequences of Martin Krygier’s insistence that it is arbitrariness we
must control if we are to succeed in the rule of law project, but I take it in a new
direction. Though I have stated I do not believe that his conclusions about
arbitrariness are tentative, I suggest they are tender and vulnerable because abuse
of the idea of the rule of law by self-willed leaders brings the rule of law ideal into
disrepute, no matter how well we hedge it with institutional checks and balances.
The poor behaviour of wicked leaders8 dilutes the confidence of citizens in the rule of
law project as a whole, despite the accuracy of scholarly rule of law analysis to date.
While ancient philosophers understood that no legal system was safe when it was
administered and managed by wicked leaders, there was no obvious way to insist on
personal virtue and genuine public service ideals in those leaders once they had
assumed the reins of power.9 Paragon leaders could cure the defects of any
technically inefficient leadership system, but tyrants could destroy a perfect
prototype.
While I would like to suggest a way to implement the ancient Greek and Roman
philosophical view that rulers and administrators should be paragons of virtue, my
more modest suggestion is that the virtue expectations we have of those who
exercise judicial power ought to be transferable into executive, legislative and
corporate space, since they are well understood and have convincing power.
I present this short thesis in three parts. In the first, I summarise some of the
luminary work of Martin Krygier and set out the bones of his thought about the nature
of the rule of law. In the second, I briefly review the place that some ancient
philosophers saw in what we now call the rule of law project for personal human
virtue. In the third part, I make some tentative ‘institutional rule of law virtue’
suggestions of my own, standing on the shoulders of both Martin Krygier and some
ancient philosophers. While I would like to conclude that personal virtue in managers
and political leaders is an essential element of any administration that aspires to the
rule of law label, I settle for the idea that the same ‘virtues’ we expect of those we
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appoint to exercise judicial power could be expected of those who exercise
legislative and executive power wherever we find such power – that is, in both
political and corporate contexts.
I conclude that the future of the idea of the rule of law should see us hold all those
who exercise power in our lives to standards of conduct that are already well defined
in the judicial context. This discussion also implies that we should vote for virtues in
both political elections and in shareholder meetings.
I. Martin Krygier on the rule of law
Professor Krygier is emphatic that there is no one true rule of law system.10 A
political system that conforms to rule of law ideals may be manufactured for any
country no matter what its traditions, but that system’s underlying traditions have to
be analysed before we can work out a rule of law system that can work in it. Since
(quoting Alasdair MacIntyre) traditions are arguments extended through time,11 we
have to determine not so much whether a country’s traditions are right or wrong, but
whether they are consistent with rule of law ideals. If law has not traditionally been
used to enable human freedom, then to re-engineer that system in a manner that
complies with rule of law ideals and enables and maximises human freedom, we will
have to abandon traditions and ways of thinking that are inconsistent with the rule of
law ideal.12
Professor Krygier also observes that, since all governments now seem to recognise
that it is a human good to have a political system that satisfies rule of law standards,
everyone claims that theirs is a rule of law system. But Professor Krygier is quite
ruthless in identifying legal systems that do not meet those standards no matter how
much the rule of law label may be claimed for them. Russia has not traditionally used
law to enable human freedom and still does not after the Iron Curtain came down. 13
Poland is not a country where the rule of law ideal has flourished.14 Modern Chinese
communist party claims that their governmental system follows the rule of law are
empty and even Singapore’s tiger economy only gets ‘two cheers’ when measured
against a rule of law checklist.15 But it is harder to pick a rule of law winner between
modern Germany and the UK. While the German economy has been ticking away
like a well-oiled machine for hundreds of years, it does not have the release valves
that the messy common law English system provides and its system and
predictability has not consistently banished arbitrariness.16 But the English rule of
law system is not as long-standing as foundational invocations of Magna Carta
would have us believe. Magna Carta did not take particularly quickly and has been
ignored by English monarchs, and then by its parliaments, for most of its 800 years
10
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of existence.17 The North American system is not perfect either. There, as others
have pointed out, an obsession with the idea that religious and state institutions have
to be entirely separated to enable a perfect rule of law settlement, stops political
analysts understanding how European countries with established churches provide
just as much human freedom as is enjoyed in the land of the free.18
Achieving a healthy rule of law national scorecard is not just about the structure of
the legal system. The point is to create a system where citizens feel that they know
what the law is; where it is certain enough to be predictable and nothing unexpected
and arbitrary disturbs the peaceful enjoyment of citizen freedoms.19 The rule of law
does not seek to denude the state of its power to promptly implement wise decisions,
but to constrain and temper state power so that state decision-making does not
unpredictably interfere with citizen autonomy.20 Krygier says that many would-be rule
of law systems are motivated by a fearful need to prevent the state doing what it
might otherwise do.21 But where the fear remains, there is a sense that the rule of
law settlement is uneasy and tentative, and that will constrain the entrepreneurial
spirit of trustworthy law-obedient citizens. In other words, any rule of law settlement
where the citizens feel uncertain about their future, for institutional reasons, falls
short of the ideal, but that does not mean that the system entirely fails. All rule of law
systems are ‘works in progress’. Krygier also points out that governments are not the
only institutions that cause citizen uncertainty. Corporations, including banks, ‘can do
a lot of damage’22 and the resulting citizen fear is unlikely to be cured by institutional
reform alone. ‘These are exceedingly complicated matters’23 and the solutions will
likely lie ‘beyond institutions’24 and possibly in a ‘social science that does not quite
yet exist’.25
At core, it is arbitrariness that is the enemy. If citizens and their lawyers can predict
the public outcomes in their lives without fear, the rule of law mission will have been
accomplished.26 All law-abiding citizens should feel safe in all their societal
interactions. Where discretion has a place in their lives, it will be exercised in a
17
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predictable manner that maximises their freedoms.27 But arbitrariness does not
happen in a vacuum. If it is embedded in the system, it was put there by humans
who did not properly forecast the results or did not want their system to be
completely fair. And if the arbitrariness is not systemic and is the result of decisionmaking against the interests of a citizen or citizens by an unconstrained leader, then
again it is human personality that is the ultimate engine of the resulting citizen
discomfort. Here Professor Krygier notes that the idea of the rule of law has ancient
roots. Plato, Aristotle and Cicero all had things to say about how to engineer an
ideally just system.28
2. The rule of law in ancient philosophy
Indeed, Krygier’s discussion of leader moderation and temperance as the solution to
institutional caprice comes from ancient philosophy. While most modern advocates
of the rule of law would moderate and temper the law by hedging it with institutional
checks and balances, the ancients spoke of moderation and temperance as human
virtues and saw them as the ultimate backstop in preventing the abuse of power.
Krygier’s summary of the ancient roots of the rule of law idea includes at least
subliminally, the ancient view that some were more suited to rule than others
because of their virtue:
[T]he point of the rule of law … is to temper or moderate the exercise of
power, to avoid its arbitrary use, not necessarily to weaken or shackle it. …
Such concerns are … implicit in Aristotle’s distinctions between ‘true forms’ of
government, concerned with ‘the common interest,’ and those that ‘regard
only the interest of the rulers’. The latter ‘are all defective and perverted forms
… for they are despotic, whereas a state is a community of freemen’. … ‘The
rule of law … is preferable to that of any individual … even if it be better for
certain individuals to govern, they should be made only guardians and
ministers of the law’. One reason for such rule of law is that it helps to prevent
the overreaching (pleonexia) that Aristotle feared, and to engender that virtue
exalted in Greek drama and Greek philosophy alike.29
Krygier also noted that the Romans saw temperance as the final protection from the
abuse of power in the ‘glosse[s of] Cicero and [the] Roman writers’.30 This passing
summary resonates with Plato’s famous view that benevolent dictatorship was the
most efficient form of government31 because it did not unduly shackle the efficient
exercise of power as Aristotle might have said. That is because the unfettered power
bestowed upon a benevolent king was rendered harmless by his personal virtue.32
The ancient point, as the book of First Samuel in the Hebrew scriptures has also
stated, is that institutional checks and balances alone cannot neutralise the
wickedness of individual rulers. Once a bad ruler is in place, he cannot be dislodged
27
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without bloodshed.33 So why does our modern political science focus so much on
institutional apparatus rather than on human virtues as the key to rule of law
achievement?34
3. The place for virtue in 21st century political science
The simple answer may be that it seems easier to rearrange societal institutions than
to convince society that we should prioritise personal virtue when we select our
public office holders. But it is also difficult to define personal human virtue in a way
that everyone can agree with, to separate the virtues we can agree on from how we
deliver them,35 and to guarantee or sustain an enduring vision of virtue after we have
first bottled it.
The difficulty in identifying the human virtues that are essential if arbitrary decisionmaking is to be avoided, arises partly because the relevant virtues were different for
Plato and Aristotle in ancient Greece than for Saints Peter and Paul in the first
century of the common era. And their ancient virtues are different from those that
would be agreed upon by the majority of voters in 21st century Australia.
But decision-making virtues are also difficult to separate from the institutional
arrangements we make to protect the rule of law in modern societies. For example,
decision-maker independence is a personal virtue that transcends culture, but it is
also a virtue that we have developed legal rules to entrench. Decision-maker
impartiality is the same. Impartiality is a personal virtue, but it is a personal virtue that
can be identified, measured and institutionally enforced.
Decision-maker courtesy and civility, however, is not a virtue that is currently hedged
with rule of law enforceability. Because society does not institutionally measure and
enforce courtesy and civility, judges, public servants and politicians think it is less
important to be civil than to be independent and impartial when they make public
decisions. Most developed nations have established legal rules which require judicial
decision-makers to give reasons for their decisions. But reasons and related
transparency are not yet enforced in all administrative, executive and corporate
decision-making contexts, despite recognition that transparency in all decisionmaking is a virtue.
The English common law idea – that decisions are not just and do not comply with
the rule of law if they were not made in a procedurally fair manner – has its analogue
in the US idea of due process from the Fourteenth Amendment. Again, the law in
33
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both traditions has developed rules which require procedural fairness and due
process in judicial and administrative decision-making though not yet in all executive
and corporate decision-making. Similarly, politicians making executive decisions do
not yet feel obliged to always provide some form of hearing for all people affected by
their executive decisions, even though that expectation is protected by law in the
case of judicial and administrative decisions in both the English and US legal
systems. It is the same when it comes to evidence. Those who are affected by
judicial and administrative decisions will have a cause of action and a remedy if they
learn that they did not have all the relevant evidence when they had their hearing.
But the non-publication of all the relevant evidence does not yet consistently
invalidate executive decisions though there may be political consequences for an
executive decision-maker who does not publish all the evidence, especially if the
non-availability of that evidence can also be characterised as the result of bias (a
lack of the virtue of impartiality) or as purposeful obfuscation (a lack of the virtue of
transparency).
This multiple or hybrid characterisation of absent virtue suggests that the rule of law
virtues may most helpfully be seen as having a compound nature. That is, like
freedom of thought, speech and association, the rule of law virtues can be separately
identified, but they are at their strongest and most protective when they are found
together.
Identifying and enforcing the rule of law virtues
In this short discussion, I have suggested that there are at least nine rule of law
virtues (not necessarily personal virtues) that 21st century voters and philosophers
should be able to agree on. Separated from my narrative, they are: Independence,
Impartiality, Courtesy, Civility, the provision of Reasons for decisions, Transparency,
Procedural Fairness/Due Process, the provision of some form of Hearing, and the
provision of all the relevant Evidence to all the parties potentially affected by a
decision. None of these qualities that I have labelled as rule of law virtues are new.
What may be new is the suggestion that all nine should apply to all forms of public
administration and decision making, whether judicial, administrative, executive or
corporate.
We generally accept and enforce all of these requirements in judicial decisionmaking, but our civilisation currently requires less rigour in administrative decisionmaking, and less still in the political, executive or corporate arenas. I suggest that
this reduced rigour in administrative, executive and corporate decision-making
contexts explains why our rule of law compliance, even in the most developed
Western countries, feels tentative. That tentative feeling is the result of a lack of
rigour in requiring all administrative, executive and corporate decision-makers to
comply with all the requirements of the rule of law including the rule of law virtues,
when they make any decision.
Ethics
This brief discussion of decision-making virtues would not be complete without some
mention of ethics. Again, rule of law compliance is more developed in judicial
decision-making than in administrative, executive or corporate decision-making. That

is because a high level of personal virtue is already required from judicial decisionmakers. That judicial virtue requirement is manifest in the ethical rules developed for
lawyers during the last two centuries. Judicial decision-makers are seldom appointed
without legal experience and modern lawyers are bound to extensive bodies of
ethical rules in their pre-judicial practice. Post judicial appointment, judicial decisionmakers are expected to continue to follow the ethical rules in which they were trained
as legal practitioners, but they are also bound to additional ethical codes.
The same cannot be said for all administrative, executive and corporate decisionmakers. They may be required to make oath or to affirm that they will faithfully serve
their countries, or they may have fiduciary duties to their shareholders, but the exact
nature of that faithful service is not spelled out in detailed ethical codes as it is for
lawyers and judges. Administrative, executive and corporate decision-makers may
be politically obliged to abide by contemporary moral standards, but detailed rule of
law virtue rules have not yet been developed and made binding upon them.
Conclusion
In this article, I have agreed with Martin Krygier that the rule of law project needs
more work. The idea is sound but it is incomplete. Indeed, when it is treated as a
technical thing, separate from social conditions and the human beings that operate
the legal systems which the rule of law is intended to temper and moderate, it may
be dangerous. That danger is that of misunderstanding and misrepresentation.
When a society believes a legal system satisfies rule of law standards absent
personal virtue in its operators, and when the institutional virtues expected of those
who exercise judicial power are not applied to and expected of those who exercise
legislative, executive and corporate power, that society falls short of its rule of law
potential and is apt to pretend that it meets standards that it does not meet.
I have also suggested that there are at least nine institutional rule of law virtues that
all societies which aspire to live according to rule of law standards should be able to
agree on. But I have also suggested that the rule of law project is incomplete, even
in the West, because western legal systems do not insist that all public and
corporate decision-makers comply with these virtues every time they make a
decision in their public and corporate offices. We have high expectations, and closely
measure the performance, of all those who hold judicial office. But we have not yet
imposed those obligations on all our administrative, executive and corporate decision
makers. We should.
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